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This paper develops a new endurantistic theory of persistence. The theory
is built around one basic tenet, which concerns the relation between objects and
time, i.e. existence at a time. According to this tenet, for an object to exist at a
time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. For reasons
that will become obvious later, I call this tenet transcendentism.
I will argue that transcendentism reveals itself to be a semantically grounded
and metaphysically fruitful choice. Semantically grounded, insofar as a semantic
analysis of our ordinary temporal talk seem to strongly favour it over rivals.
Metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built
around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires
neither temporal parts nor the metaphysically problematic assumptions to which
all extant versions of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of
extended simples or of multilocation.
In §1, I present the current state of the debate between endurantism and
perdurantism, with a focus on what I call the locative turn. Thanks to the
locative turn, it is now possible to distinguish at least two diﬀerent forms of
endurantism. However, both are based on problematic assumptions. In §2, I
sketch transcendentism and the theory of persistence that can be built around
it, as well as their semantic groundedness and metaphysical fruitfulness.
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1 Endurantism, perdurantism and the locative
turn
Let us say that an object persists through time if and only if it exists at various
times. Nowadays most philosophers agree that objects persist through time1.
Yet, they disagree on how they do so. The bulk of their disagreement is whether
or not such objects have temporal parts2. So-called perdurantists think they do,
so-called endurantists think they do not. The conflict between endurantists and
perdurantists is made up of several well-known arguments against endurantism.
Perdurantists think that temporal parts are needed in order to account for the
phenomena such as change, mereological coincidence and vagueness. From their
side, endurantists insist that they can account for those phenomena just as well
without temporal parts, and so find the whole idea that objects have temporal
parts unmotived, let alone per se implausible.
Yet another challenge for the endurantist concerns the very definition of his
view. Perdurantism may be based on a prima facie implausible tenet, yet it is
has a clear and positive definition: according to it, persisting objects have tem-
poral parts. On the other hand, endurantism is often characterized in purely
negative terms, as the thesis that objects do not have temporal parts. Some-
times, endurantism is defined in positive terms, as the thesis that objects are
wholly present at various times. Still, this definition rests on the notion of being
“wholly present”, which many take to be unclear. What does it mean that x is
wholly present at a time t? It does not mean that every part that x has at any
1With the possible exception of stage theorists such as (Hawley, 2001; Sider, 2001; Varzi,
2003).
2Let x be a temporal part of y just in case x is a part of y, exists only at a time t, and
overlaps everything that is part of y and exists at t. Another way of putting that is that
temporal parts are what you get when you slice an entity along the temporal dimension, so
that you have diﬀerent parts of it at diﬀerent times. Events are usually taken to have these
kinds of parts, so that, e.g. a football match divides into two temporal parts, the first and
the second half.
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time is part of x at t, otherwise it would be impossible for x to change parts
over time. Neither does that mean that every part that x has at t is a part
of x at t, because that is a trivial claim that also the perdurantist would like
to hold. Perhaps, it just means that x has no temporal part at t. But in this
case, to be wholly present at various times would just mean to persist without
having temporal parts, so that endurantism would again turn out to be defined
in purely negative terms.
Should an endurantist give up to this challenge, and admit that endurantism
is intuitive but yet unclear? Thankfully for the endurantist, recent work on the
notion of location can help him in doing much better. Let me first say a few
words on the notion of location, and then explain how it can help the endurantist
in defining his view.
Let exact location be the relation between an entity x and a region r of a
dimension d which holds just in case x and r have the same shape, boundaries,
size, and stand in the same distance relations in d with other entities (Gilmore,
2006, 2007, 2008). For example, the exact spatial location of an ice cube is that
cubic spatial region where the cube perfectly fits and is as distant to everything
else as the cube is. Exact location has to be contrasted to other notions of
location, most notably weak location. A weak location of an entity is a region
that is not completely free of that entity. In mereological terms, we can define
a weak location of x as any region that overlaps the exact location of x. The ice
cube, for example, is weakly located at the region of my glass, of the room, of
the universe as well as at any sub-region of its exact location.
The term location comes from the spatial case, but there seems to be no
reason to deny on principle the possibility that a perfectly similar relation con-
cerns other dimensions as well. Quite the contrary, metaphysicians feel free to
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Figure 1.1: Weak and exact location: the round entity x is weakly located at
regions r1, r2, r3, r5, is exactly located at r1, and is neither exactly nor weakly
located at r4.
speak of temporal and spatiotemporal location as well (Parsons, 2007; Gilmore,
2006, 2007, 2008; Sattig, 2006; Balashov, 2010; Bittner and Donnelly, 2006).
If the relevant dimension may change, the conditions for being exactly located
do not. For example, take the temporal case. An entity x is exactly located
at a temporal region t, be it an instant or an interval of time, just in case, x
and t share shape, boundaries, size, and distance relations. For example, the
exact temporal location of World War II is a six-years interval of time spanning
from 1939 to 1945. WWII shares with that region its shape and size – both are
temporally extended and last six years – and shares with it temporal distance
relations – both are, for example, 21 years after WWI.
Let us now focus on temporal location. Nowadays most philosophers agree
that objects are located in time3. Yet, they disagree at which regions of time
they are exactly located. Some of them believe that objects have one exact tem-
poral location. They take this unique exact temporal location to be the interval
of an object’s persistence – the one which has as boundaries the instants at
which the persisting object comes into being and goes out of existence, respec-
tively. Call these philosophers unilocists. Some others believe that objects have
3Pace Simons (2014) andFine (2006).
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several exact temporal locations. They think that a persisting object is exactly
located at all and only the instants included in the interval of their persistence.
Call these philosophers multilocists.
Let us explore a bit these two options. First, we can lay down a straight-
forward connection between unilocationism and an idea that has long been
connected to, or identified with, perdurantism, i.e. the idea that objects are
extended both in space and in time. Let us recall that exact location is linked
to size: if x is exactly located at r, x and r have the same size. In the temporal
case, size boils down to temporal extension: something that is located in time
can either be temporally extended – iﬀ it is exactly located at an interval – or
unextended – if it is exactly located at instants only –. Hence, multi-locists have
it that objects are not extended in time while uni-locists have it that objects
are extended in time. Second, another straightforward path lead us from the
idea that objects are extended in space and time to another idea that has long
been connected to, or identified with, perdurantism, i.e. the idea that objects
have a four-dimensional shape. If we replace space and time with spacetime,
the claim that objects are extended in space and time translates into the claim
that objects are exactly located at a four-dimensional spatiotemporal region.
Recall that exact location is linked to shape: if x is exactly located at r, x and
r have the same shape. Given that uni-locists have it that objects are exactly
located at four-dimensional regions of spacetime, they also have it that objects
themselves have a four-dimensional shape. Let us now have a look at the multi-
locationist picture. Given that muli-locationism has it that objects are exactly
located at instants of time, and given that instants are unextended, it follows
that according to the multi-locationist objects are temporally unextended. And
once we replace space and time with spacetime, the multi-locist ends up de-
fending the view that objects have a three-dimensional shape, given that their
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exact spatiotemporal location can at most be a three-dimensional, temporally
unextended, region. Both claims, i.e. that objects are not extended in time
and that objects are three-dimensional, have traditionally been connected to,
or identified with, endurantism.
Figure 1.2: Multilocationism and unilocationism: a three-dimensional object
occupies a four-dimensional region by being multi-located through it, while a
four-dimensional object occupies that region by being exactly located at it.
Unilocationism implies claims that are traditionally identified with perdu-
rantism, while multilocationism implies claims that are traditionally identified
with endurantism. At this point one may be tempted to say that unilocationism
simply is perdurantism in disguise and that the same holds for multilocation-
ism and endurantism. However, notice that the two disputes diﬀer in content.
The endurantism/perdurantism dispute concerns the having or not of temporal
parts; the uni-/multilocationism dispute concerns the exact temporal location
and geometry of an entity. Moreover, it has been suggested that the two dis-
putes do not align with one another, for unilocationism – as a locational thesis –
may perhaps be compatible with endurantism – as a thesis concerning temporal
parts –.
More interestingly, if we keep the two disputes apart, we are finally able
to define in a clear and positive way not only one, but actually two, forms
of endurantism. The first and more obvious one simply is multilocationism.
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Recall that according to multi-locism an object persists through time by being
exactly temporally located at each instant of its persistence (Gilmore, 2004,
2006; Sattig, 2006; Bittner and Donnelly, 2006). This view qualifies as a form
of endurantism, for multilocationism implies endurantism: since what includes
all of the object at a time is the object itself exactly located there, it cannot be
a (proper) part of it; a fortiori, it is not a (proper) temporal part of it.
The second and less obvious form of endurantism that we are now in a posi-
tion to define makes appeal to the notion of an extended simple. An extended
simple is an entity that is both extended in a dimension – i.e. exactly located
at an extended region of that dimension – and mereologically simple, i.e. with-
out any proper parts. If extended simples are possible, an endurantist may
endorse the unilocationist view, and so claim that a persisting object is tempo-
rally extended, and yet think that this object is an extended simple(Parsons,
2000, 2007). This view qualifies as a form of endurantism, for, once again, it
implies it: the persisting objects has no (proper) temporal parts because it has
no (proper) parts at all. For obvious reasons, I will label this view simplism.
So far I have characterized simplism and multilocationism by means of their
definitions. Still, it is interesting to see how things work at a deeper level, by
analyzing the constitutive postulates on which the views depend. On the one
hand, multilocationism depends on the possibility of multilocation, i.e. the pos-
sibility that an entity be exactly located at more than one region of a dimension.
In other words, multilocationism requires the negation of a principle called the
functionality of exact location, according to which exact location is functional:
an entity can have at most one exact location at a dimension:
[functionality] x@r ^ x@s! r = s
On the other hand, simplism depends on the possibility of extended simples.
In other words, simplism requires the negation of a principle called arbitrary
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partition, a.k.a. the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts [DAUP], according
to which extension implies composition: entities have a proper part for each
sub-region of their exact location:
[DAUP] x@r ! 8s(s⌧ r ! 9y(y ⌧ x ^ y@s))
Are the constitutive postulates of these two views any plausible? Let us try to
answer this question step by step, and let us being with extended simples.
Are extended simples possible? In some theories of location, extended sim-
ples turn out to be conceptually impossible, e.g. in (Casati and Varzi, 1999).
And even if there are theories of location that are formally compatible with
extended simples, many think that these entities are simply conceptually or
metaphysically impossible, because extension implies mereological composition.
However, notice that DAUP is not still enough to prove that extended entities
have proper parts. In particular, two additional assumptions need to be made.
The first one is that the given entity is not multilocated. Otherwise, it could
be multilocated at each part of any of its exact locations and hence not vio-
late DAUP. (Curiously enough, this fact shows that – contrary to what many
thought (van Inwagen, 1990; Sider, 2001) – endurantism, in its multilocationist
form, seems to be fully compatible with the doctrine of arbitrary undetached
parts). On the other hand, if an entity has just one exact location the parts
located at the proper parts of their exact location must be proper parts. To
be sure, suppose x is located at r, and there is an r’ which is a proper part of
r. If it is a proper part of r, it must be numerically distinct from it. Hence,
x cannot be exactly located there. Hence, the y that, by DAUP, is exactly
located at r’ is numerically distinct from x. Hence, again by DAUP, it is a
proper part of it. The second additional assumption that has to be made to
prove that if DAUP is true then extended entities have proper parts is that
extended regions themselves have proper parts. This sounds like an innocent
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assumption. However, in recent years, some argued in favour of extended sim-
ple regions (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, 2006). If one of the two assumptions
is dropped, there might be extended simples even if DAUP is true. However,
the first assumption is explicitly denied by Simplism. On the other hand, the
second assumption does not serve well Simplism after all. Even if there were
extended simple regions, they would be extremely small, or at least existing
arguments support only the existence of extremely small extended simple re-
gions (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, 2006). Hence, the theories would not be
able to make sense of common cases of persistence in which substances persist
for a reasonably extended amount of time. A theory that allows for the per-
sistence of short-living entities only would not be much useful. Simplism really
has to drop DAUP completely, if it wants to make sense of ordinary cases of
persistence. And this is unfortunate, because many think that DAUP should be
conceptually or metaphysically necessarily true (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller,
2006; Casati and Varzi, 1996, 1999; Hofweber and Velleman, 2011; Sider, 1997).
Let us now turn to the possibility of multilocation. Many take the very idea
of multilocation to be incoherent or even non-sense. The incoherence charge
comes from a battery of alleged paradoxes that the hypothesis generates. About
the paradoxes, much has been written and I limit myself to review them briefly.
According to a first alleged paradox, any multilocated entity would constitute a
contradiction. In fact, when an entity is multilocated at regions r and r’, it will
be at a zero distance from itself but also at a non-zero – basically the distance
n that divides r and r’ – distance from itself (Ehring, 2002; Gilmore, 2003).
Another famous paradox regarding multilocation goes as follows. If an entity
persists through an interval of time in the way multilocationism says it does,
it will be temporally unextended. However, there is something, the sum of all
“instances” of that substance, one for each instant of the interval, which seems
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to be temporally extended. And such a sum simply is the multilocated sub-
stance itself, because summing an entity with itself will always return nothing
else than the entity itself again. Hence, the entity is both temporally extended
and instantaneous (Barker and Dowe, 2003, 2005). Other paradoxes show the
incompatibility of multilocation, time travel and widely accepted principles of
mereology, such as antisymmetry, transitivity or weak supplementation (Eﬃn-
gham and Robson, 2007; Gilmore, 2007; Kleinschmidt, 2011). The non-sense
charge against multilocationism comes from appearence of there being no way
of making sense of exact location that does not make multilocation hopeless.
All definitions of exact location make multilocation impossible, and taking it
as a primitive rules out cases that seem to be conceptually possible (Parsons,
2007).
With multilocationism and simplism in hand, the endurantist has finally
laid to rest the challange that endurantism is unclear and undefinable in posi-
tive terms. The search for a clear definition for endurantism has led to not only
one, but actually two competing forms of endurantism. More generally, the
introduction of the concept of location in the persistence debate has radically
reshaped the debate itself, so that one is tempted to talk of a veritable turn, a
locative turn, here. Yet both new forms of endurantism rest on postulates which
have been taken to be conceptually, logically, or metaphysically problematic and
counter-intuitive. The outcome of this discussion is somehow surprisingly un-
comfortable for the endurantist. Before the locative turn, endurantism seemed
to be intuitive but yet unclear. After the locative turn endurantism seems to
be clear but counter-intuitive.
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2 Transcendentism
In the previous section, I explained how the introduction of the concept of
location in the persistence debate – the locative turn – brought the debate to a
deeper level of analysis. After this turn, the various theories in play are no longer
characterized by their attitude towards temporal parts, but also and primarily
by the way in which they say objects exist at extended regions of time, e.g. by
being exactly located at, or multilocated through, such extended regions. This
turn allowed us to distinguish two forms of endurantism, i.e. multilocationism
and simplism. However, this turn also highlighted the fact that both forms of
endurantism rely on highly problematic assumptions. This result seems to leave
the persistence debate in a sort of impasse, especially from the endurantistic
point of view, for endurantists seem to have lost their alleged advantage of
holding the most intuitive view.
This section will introduce transcendentism as a solution to this impasse,
for transcendentism, as we shall see, is a form of endurantism that is free of
the problematic postulates of both multilocationism and simplism. Recall that
persistence is defined in terms of existence at a time: for an object to persist,
it is said, is for it to exist at diﬀerent times. The notion of existence at a time
will play a central role in this section, so let us begin by focussing on it for a
moment.
Existence at a time is the relation linking an object to time, or more pre-
cisely, to the instants and intervals of time at which the object is present. So,
for example, I exist now and at any instant or interval of the past year, as well
as at any instant of the interval of my life and any temporal region overlapping
such instants. Existence at a time is diﬀerent from quantification, or existence
simpliciter (Sider, 2001, 58-59). Existence at a time is a relation, while quan-
tification is not. Quantification, unlike existence at a time, concerns all kinds
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of entities, also those that are outside of time, if any. Quantification is what
determines what makes part of our ontology, while existence at a time simply
informs us about the times at which an object is present4.
To my knowledge, not much has been written about existence at a time.
One outstanding question concerning existence at a time is: what is it for an
object to exist at a time? After the locative turn, extant theories of persistence
carry with them an implicit answer to this question. According to this answer,
existence at a time is location (weak location, more precisely): for an object
to exist at a time is for it to be weakly located at that time. I think that the
assumption is false, and that the impasse in which the debate is stuck is basically
due to this false assumption. In what follows, I will explain why I think that
the assumption is false, and will put forward an alternative view. I will begin
with a parallel debate concerning the spatial profile of universals that originally
inspired the view and that will help us bring the picture to light.
2.1 Transcendentism: the analogy with universals
In the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis traces a parallelism between endurantism
on the one hand and the spatial profile of universals on the other. He writes
(Lewis, 1986, 202)
Endurance corresponds to the way a universal would be wholly
present wherever and whenever it is instantiated.
The parallelism suggests that in order to better understand endurantism, we
should have a look at the way in which universals are in space. And there, there
are basically two views, i.e. immanentism and transcendentism. According
4A conflation between existence at a time and existence simpliciter may be due to the
closeness of their names. Perhaps, to avoid this ambiguity, one may think to replace existence
at a time with presence at a time. Yet, this move would only replace an ambiguity with another
ambiguity, the one between presence at a time and the tensional present of presentism, the
growing block and the moving spotlight. For this reason, I will stick to standard terminology
here.
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to immanentism, universals are present in space by being located at regions
thereof. According to transcendentism, universals are present in space only by
being instantiated by objects which, in turn, are located at regions of space5.
Figure 2.1: Immanentism and transcendentism about universals.
Notice that immanentism claims that universals are present in space by being
located at regions thereof, but it does not yet specify in which way universals
are located at several regions theoreof. It does not claim, for example, that they
are multi-located, because have an exact location for each place where they are
instantiated (Gilmore, 2003), or that they are extended, scattered, entities that
are singly located at the union of the location of their instances (Eﬃngham,
2015). On the other hand, transcendentism denies both options, because it
denies that universals are located in space at all.
One question about transcendentism concerns its precise formulation. Tran-
scendentism says that for a universal to be instantiated at a region of space
is for it to be instantiated by an object which is located at that region. The
transcendentist claim has the following form: for x to be F is for x to be G.
5To be more precise, we should distinguish between two senses in which a conception of
universals is immanentist or transcendentist, viz. a locative sense and an ontological sense.
According to the ontological sense, universals are immanent iﬀ they need to be instantiated
in order to exist; otherwise they are transcendent (Lowe, 2006). In what follows, I will focus
on the locative sense only.
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But what does it mean here that for x to be F is for x to be G? Here are two
unsuccessful ways in which the claim can be read. According to the first reading,
the transcendentist is proposing a simple material equivalence: a universal is
instantiated at a region iﬀ an object instantiates it and is located at that region.
According to the second reading, the transcendentist is proposing a grounding6
claim: a universal is instantiated at a region in virtue of its being instantiated
by an object which is located at that region. I do not think these two readings
really make justice to the transcendentist position. To see this, notice that also
the immanentist could agree on them. The immanentist believes that redness is
located here. She could also agree with the grounding claim and say that redness
is located here because redness is instantiated by my cup which is located here.
And it is likely that the immanentist will agree on the material equivalence as
well: the immanentist would not deny that redness is located wherever there is
something that instantiates it, and vice versa.
I think that the transcendentist position is better understood in terms of re-
duction: a universal’s being instantiated at a region reduces to its being instanti-
ated by an object that is located at that region7. What distinguishes grounding
and reduction? An example coming from the philosophy of mind may be en-
lightening on this regard. As regards the mental, one may be an eliminativist,
and say that there are no mental entities at all (Rorty, 1965; Churchland, 1981,
1984, 1986; Stich, 1983), or one may be a realist, and say that there are mental
entities, such as mental episodes, for example. Further, a realist about the men-
tal can be a reductionist or a non-reductionist. According to the reductionist,
mental episodes reduce to physical ones, so that anytime you have a mental
episode and its physical correlate, you do not have two episodes, but only one
6Let grounding be what links facts when one of them obtain in virtue of, or because of,
some others (Correia, 2005; Fine, 2012; Rosen, 2010; Schaﬀer, 2012).
7More on reduction and its distinction from grounding can be found in (deRosset, 2013;
King, 1998; Rosen, 2010).
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(Lewis, 1970; Armstrong, 1968; Braddon-Mitchell, 2003; Jackson, 2003). Ac-
cording to the non-reductionist, mental episodes do not reduce to physical ones,
and thus when we talk about a mental episode and its physical correlate, we
are really speaking about two diﬀerent entities. Finally, a non-reductionist may
still hold that even though the mental does not reduce to, it still is grounded in,
the physical, because the physical correlate of a mental episode plays a role in
the metaphysical explanation of the occurence of the mental one (Correia, 2005;
Correia and Schnieder, 2012; Dasgupta, 2014; Fine, 2012; Schaﬀer, 2009). From
this example, we may draw the following consequences. Reduction is somehow
akin to identity: if the mental reduces to the physical, then the mental episode
and its physical correlate are just one episode. On the other hand, grounding
posits a relation between two facts, which still remain numerically distinct, so
that both need to be admitted in our ontology: when one claims that the mental
is grounded in the physical one is not thereby committing oneself to the claim
that physical and mental states are numerically identical. Defined in reduction
terms, transcendentism is incompatible with immanentism, which claims that
we should posit in our ontology both a relation of location between universals
and space and the two relations linking universals to objects and objects to
space. I take this fact to be the core of their disagreement.
2.2 Immanentism and commonsense
I trust I’ve said enough about how transcendentism and immanentism should
be characterized in the context of universals. Let us now go back to the case of
objects and time. There too, we may individuate an immanentist view about
how objects are in time – about what it is for the to exist at a time, to use the
standard terminology introduced before. According to this immanentist view,
for an object to exist at a time is for it to be located at that time. As already
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stated, immanentism is an implicit assumption of all theories of persistence
described so far. This implcit assumption that existence at a time is location
has proven itself useful insofar as recent work on the concept of location proper
have been used to distinguish diﬀerent theories of persistence and define those
already existing. But of course, the usefulness of an assumption does not make
that assumption true. Quite the contrary, I think that immanentism about
existence at a time is false.
Here is a first way in which someone may argue against immanentism. Recall
that for something to be located at a region is for that thing to have the same
shape, boundaries and size of that region and to stand with other entities in
the same distance relations had by the region (Gilmore, 2006, 2007). If this
is the case, for an object to be located in time implies for it to have shapes,
sizes, and to enter distance relations with other entities. And this is prima facie
implausible. Consider the following sentence that ascribes a temporal distance
to two objects:
(1) Aristotle is fifteen years later than Socrates.
This first sentence surely sounds awkward, as well as many others ascribing
temporal distance to objects. One may be tempted to resist, and say that when
one asserts (1), what one really mean is that
(2) Aristotle’s birth is fifteen years later than Socrates’ death.
This second sentence sounds more kosher. However, notice that in this second
sentence temporal distance relations are not ascribed to objects – Aristotle and
Socrates –, but rather to events in which Aristotle and Socrates are somehow
involved – their death and birth, respectively. So the claim that sentences
ascribing temporal distance relations to objects sound awkward still stand.
What should we do with these semantic considerations against immanen-
tism? It goes without saying that it would be illegitimate to conclude from
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them that immanentism is false. After all, we may build up semantic consid-
erations against heliocentrism, special relativity and quantum mechanics, and
hardly anybody would grant those considerations any theoretical force. I be-
lieve that immanentism is false, but I think that the best way to show that it
is false consists in highlighting its metaphysical problems and how such prob-
lems may be solved by means of a theory built on its negation. Still, there is
something that may be read out of the semantics of our natural language, or at
least something that such semantics may help spelling out, i.e. our deep-rooted
metaphysical intuitions. It is controversial whether intuitions should have any
weight in philosophy, yet many metaphysicians think they play some role in
metaphysics. Those philosophers may be somehow moved by these semantic
considerations against immanentism.
Another way in which these semantic considerations may play a role in our
debate is suggesting a way of framing a transcendentist theory of existence at
a time. Recall that the heart of a transcendentist theory is that it reduces the
relation between an entity and a dimension by means of some proxy of that
entity in the give dimension. So if there is a transcendentist theory of existence
at a time, its aim should be to reduce existence at a time by means of some
proxy of objects in time. This role of proxy of objects in time may be played
by diﬀerent kinds of entities, such as states of aﬀairs, tropes or facts. However,
the semantic considerations about our temporal talk given before suggest that
events may be the most natural candidates for this role.
2.3 Events
I will here take events to be anything that happens or occurs. There are simple
and short events, such as a collision, a heating process, the uniform movement of
a body, or the mental state I am currently in, but also more complex and long
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events, such as a football match, the sum of all mental episodes constituting
my stream of consciousness during the last hour, a football match, my life, the
history of the universe.
Events have an intimate relation to time. Since events have temporal bound-
aries, a temporal extension (equal or greater than zero), and enter temporal
distance relations, I see no problem in admitting that this relation can be de-
scribed as a relation of location. Some events persist through time, and when
they do, they do so by perduring, i.e. by being exactly located at the interval
of their persistence and by divinding into temporal parts throughout it8. For
example, a life divides into diﬀerent phases, such as childhood and adultness.
Those phases are parts of a life. They sure are not spatial parts of that life,
because they are not distinguished by being at diﬀerent places. Rather, they are
temporal parts of the life, because they are distinguished by occurring at diﬀer-
ent times. I say that some events perdure because I do not exclude that there
may be instantaneous events, such as a collision, or an instantaneous temporal
part of an event. Quite the contrary, I think it is plausible that events have a
temporal part at each instant of their persistence. Otherwise, they would either
need to be temporally multi-located or temporally extended simples.
Another important relation that events have, is the one they have with
their subjects, i.e. the objects that participate in them. I call this relation
participation. I will then say that I am the participant in my current events,
my mental episodes and all events making up my life. Nothing will hang on
that later, but I think that participation must be distinguished from parthood,
because objects are not parts of events. After all, no matter the way in which
you cut an event, what you get will only be smaller events, and not entities
of a completely diﬀerent ontological category. Perhaps, participation may be
8Or at least standard lore has it that way (Casati and Varzi, 1999; Dretske, 1967; Geach,
1969; Mellor, 1998; Russell, 1903), pace Stout (1997); Galton (2006).
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another form of constitution, or at least so it is sometimes assumed to be (Kim,
1976; Lombard, 1986; Bennett, 1988). Another option, if one thinks that events
ontologically depend on objects (or the other way round) one may be to define
it in terms of ontological dependence or grounding (Correia, 2005; Fine, 2012;
Lowe, 1998; Schaﬀer, 2009; Schnieder, 2011)
Participation may come in a loose and a strict sense. In the strict sense, I
am a participant in my life and all parts thereof; and an object is a participant
in its history and all parts thereof. In the loose sense, I am a participant in
any event in which I play any role, no matter how small it is. The history of
the universe is an event in which I am a loose participant, because I play a role
in it, but no strict participant, because it is not a part of my life. Of course,
we do not need two primitive notions here. For example, we may define loose
participation in terms of strict participation: I loosely participate in any event
that overlaps an event in which I strictly participate. (As we shall see, strict
participation is the one in play in transcendentism.)
2.4 Transcendentism and the transcendentist theory of persistence
We are now in a position to properly define transcendentism about the relation
between objects and time. According to it, the existence of an object at a time
is reduced to its participating in events that are weakly located at that time.
For example, for me to exist now is for me to participate in the current temporal
part of my life and for my computer to have existed five minutes ago is for it to
have participated in the temporal part of its history located at that time. In a
motto, transcendentism has it that for an object to be in time is for it to have
a history.
Once transcendentism is put forward, its definition will aﬀect other notions
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Figure 2.2: Immanentism and transcendentism about existence at a time.
that are defined in terms of existence at a time. Most notably, persistence. Ac-
cording to both the immanentist and the transcendentist, for an object to persist
means for it to exist at various times. The immanentist conflates existence at a
time and weak location; hence, according to her, for an object to persist means
for it to be weakly located at various times. More precisely, these times have
to be taken to be instants, for an object that does not persist would anyway
be weakly located at various times – the unique instant in which it comes into
being and goes out of existence and all intervals overlapping it (Parsons, 2007).
On the other hand, the transcendentist claims that for an object to exist at
a time is for it to participate in events that are weakly located at that time;
hence, according to her, for an object to persist means for it to participate in
events that are weakly located at various times. Also in this case, these times
have to be taken to be instants, for the same reason as before. Alternatively, a
transcendentist can define the persistence of an object in terms of the temporal
location of its history. In this case, we will say that an object persists just in
case the temporal exact location of its history is temporally extended.
Since existence at a time has been introduced as a predicate that applies to
objects only, also the aforementioned definitions of persistence can only apply
to objects. However, objects are not the only entities that are said to persist
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through time. What should a transcendentist say about those other entities?
Of course, it depends on the way in which such entities relate to time. If they
are located in time, the original immanentist definitions will do. For example,
I take events to be located in time. As a consequence, I would describe their
persistence in immanentist terms: for them to persist is to be weakly located at
various instants. Otherwise, if such entities are not located in time, it will be
necessary to apply to them a strategy similar to the one applied to the case of
objects.
Suppose you decide to go transcendentist. Does that mean that you are
committing yourself to a particular theory of persistence? In other words, is
transcendentism a form of endurantism or perdurantism? The good news is that
transcendentism is an open option for everyone. Take perdurantism. A way of
describing perdurantism goes as follows. Begin with an ontology in which no
object persists through time. Simply, there is a series of instantaneous entities
that are linked one to the other by a counterpart relation. Now, suppose you are
also a mereological universalist. Those instantaneous entities will fuse together,
and the fusions will be nothing but the perduring objects, and the instantaneous
entities will be the temporal parts that the perdurantist knows and loves. Notice
that this way of describing perdurantism does not make reference to temporal
location. As a consequence, the perdurantist can save the spirit of her view in
a transcendentist setting just as well as in an immanentist one.
Even if transcendentism can be conjoined with perdurantism, I think it does
its best when conjoined with endurantism. Here I take the basic idea of en-
durantism to be that objects persist without having temporal parts. There is a
clear sense in which this can be true in the transcendentist setting, i.e. that I
– and not some proper part of me – am the participant of my life and all of its
temporal parts. So, I take the transcendentist theory of persistence to be the
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claim that objects persist through time by being the participants of all temporal
parts of their histories.
The advantages of this transcendentist theory of persistence are straight-
forward. Endurantists in particular should look at it with interest, because it
allows them to make sense of objects’ persistence through time without commit-
ting themselves to the problematic assumptions of other forms of endurantism.
Recall that the extant versions of endurantism were committed to the possibility
of multilocation or of extended simples. Given that transcendentism rejects the
idea that objects are located at times altogether, it does not require – it actually
denies – objects to be temporally multilocated, nor temporally extended.
The transcendentist theory of persistence may have further advantages, es-
pecially over the other forms of endurantism described before. For example,
unlike multilocationism, it does not require time to be discrete. Recall that
multilocationism has it that persisting objects are exactly located at instants of
time. Hence, multilocationism is committed to instants of time. On the other
hand, the transcendentist theory of persistence does not carry with it this com-
mittment. For another example, unlike simplism, the transcendentist theory of
persistence allows objects to have spatial parts. Recal that simplism has it that
objects are extended simples. If something is an extended simple, it lacks any
proper parts, so spatial parts as well9. On the other hand, the transcendentist
theory of persistence does not carry with it this committment.
9It is possible to use the core idea of simplism in order to define another theory of persistence
that has no such committments. Yet, this theory still implies that objects cannot change their
spatial parts (see author’s manuscript).
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3 Conclusion
The focus of this work has been existence at a time – the relation between ob-
jects and time –. I have argued that such a relation should not be conflated
with location and that analyzing it in terms of the events in which substances
participate may reveal itself to be a semantically grounded and metaphysically
fruitful choice. For reasons of space, I leave arguments that favour transcen-
dentism as well as the discussion of some worries – such as a worry arising
from special relativity as well as another according to which transcendentism
makes events more fundamental than objects – for another forthcoming paper.
However, what has been said so far seems to be enough to suggest that if one is
going to be an endurantist, she should seriously consider to be a transcendentist
endurantist.
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